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Spaces and Places: A Systems Theory 
Approach to Regulatory Competition in 







Abstract: This article takes issue with the longstanding oppositional themes of 
harmonisation versus regulatory competition in European company law. Instead of 
embracing one approach over the other in exclusivity, the article draws attention to the 
persisting mixture of approaches to an emerging European-wide law regulating the 
business corporation. Against the background of an ongoing struggle over identifying the 
goals and taboos of the European legislator’s mandate in regulating the company, the 
argument put forward here is that this very struggle is reflective of the nature of the 
evolution of company law in an ‘integrating Europe and a globalising world’. European 
attempts of developing European company law as part of a larger initiative of improving 
the Union’s potential for innovation and competition are thus likely to meet with the 
challenges that contemporary Nation States are facing when adapting their modes 
of regulation and representation to the demands of an increasingly complex and 
decentralised fields of market activities. Situating the law of the business corporation 
within the larger theme of European integration on the one hand, and of issues of 
market regulation, domestic, transnational, and international, on the other, suggests 
the adoption of a systems theory-based approach to understanding the boundaries of 
law in this multilevel and multipolar process. 
Law is a scavenger. It grows by feeding on ideas from outside, not by inventing new ones of its 
own. 
E. D. Elliott, (1985) 85 Columbia Law Review 38 
The law is full of phraseology drawn from morals, and by the mere force of language continually 
invites us to pass from one to the other without perceiving it, as we are sure to do unless we have the 
boundary constantly before our minds. 
O. W. Holmes Jr., (1897)10 Harvard Law Review 457, 459–460 
 
I Corporate Governance, European Integration, and Global Markets 
The process of European company law harmonisation offers itself as a case in point for 
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an inquiry into the intricate process of European integration. At the same time, it 
illustrates the nature of legal evolution as reflected in the increasingly multilevel and 
trans-territorialised norm production in the law of corporate governance. On the one 
hand, business has for a long time now come to be organised in a globe-spanning manner, 
with historically strong attempts to liberate itself of Nation States’ regulatory aspirations 
or constraints.1 This is part of the Nation State’s larger struggle over regulatory 
sovereignty with regard to the economic processes that unfold within and beyond 
national borders. On the other hand, however, corporations remain, in many respects, 
embedded in a complex field of historically grown, institutionally and legally structured 
frameworks of national regulation and administration.2 National corporate laws are 
embedded in distinct socio-economic cultures as historically grown legal and industrial 
régimes. Scholars in comparative corporate governance have become increasingly aware 
of the methodological challenges in comparing different corporate governance régimes. 
After early critiques of a functional approach to comparative law,3 comparative legal 
scholarship has become much more nuanced, contextualised, and differentiated.4 
Contemporary works place great emphasis on the particular cultures of corporate 
governance norms, the role of institutions, policies, path dependency, and innovation:5 
Corporate governance practices are partly cultural and historical products. In this context, culture 
can be defined as the conceptual framework whereby individuals, generally of the same country, 
understand and mediate the pressures of the world and motivate as well as explain their actions. As 
the corporation is a meaningful and purposeful human response to economic and social 
pressures, culture clearly informs corporate governance practices.6 
 
The considerably short history of European company law contains much evidence 
of this. In spite of a strong push for streamlining in some areas, particularly in 
capital market law due to increased demands for transparency and more efficient 
management control, it is likely that national obstacles will continue to crowd the 
 
route towards a European wide company law.7 European company law reflects the 
persisting challenges to European integration in that it highlights the difficulties of 
creating a body of law for social actors who have been relying on national rules, 
institutions, and customs within the Nation State.8 The parallel efforts of realising 
the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital through both the 
European legislator and the European Court of Justice9 have created a wide range of 
European-wide applicable rules.10 However, this process has at the same time 
consistently highlighted the immense political and socioeconomic obstacles 
growing out of Member States’ different ‘models of capitalism’,11 often associated 
with substantive costs in bringing about an effective regulatory régime for 
companies operating and investing on the European market.12 
In this article I will argue that the varied developments that characterise the 
evolution of European company law must be seen in correlation with the 
ambiguities in the EU’s general struggle over its normative identity, its 
institutional and procedural design, and its larger political and constitutional 
future (I). Two alternative and competing approaches to explain the progress of 
European company law, namely harmonisation and regulatory competition, will be 
critiqued as offering only an insufficient explanation for the particular obstacles 
faced by European company law. The political economy of European company law 
will be analysed against the background of the deep embeddedness of company 
law rules in national legal systems on the one hand, and their increasing erosion 
through a transnational law of corporate governance that is predominantly driven 
by capital market and securities law concerns on the other (II). The third part of the 
article explores the quality of the legal challenge to European integration and to 
European company law with regard to the larger transformation of regulatory 
instruments. In studying how the emergence of private law-making increasingly 
illuminates our understanding of law itself, its normative authority, and its 
 
‘boundaries’,13 it becomes apparent how both the process of European integration 
and European company law are situated in the broader context of studying the role 
of law in transnational regulatory contexts (III). 
 
A European Integration and Globalization 
The most important general legal questions, it seems to me, both in theory and in practice, concern, 
first, the nature of the relationship between a society and the legal rules that operate within it, and, 
second, the forces that cause law to change. 
A. Watson, (1982) 131 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1121 
While many problems inherent to the building of a large and complex polity 
remain, such as the genesis of rights based on membership or individual freedom,14 
the process of European integration does not take place within a spatial void. Our 
focus on the place in which European integration takes place must not make us 
blind to the forces that shape the space ‘Europe’, as it is part of processes of global 
economic integration, political struggle over dominance and power, cultural 
identity and, importantly, the rule of law. In an era of globalisation, the EU’s 
ongoing struggle over the role of law is mirrored by the threat that follows from the 
trans-territorialisation of societal activities.15 As already aptly perceived by Niklas 
Luhmann in the 1970s,16 the law faces a particular challenge in the attempt to 
address its own capacities when dealing with extra-territorial incidents and 
processes. With societal activities unfolding in what has become a global society,17 
the law as a particularly differentiated, historically emerged and institutionally 
embedded mechanism of stabilising social expectations by providing time-binding 




B European Company Law in the Process of European Integration 
In the ‘European company law scene’,19 the discussion has evolved dramatically 
since its early beginnings with the European Economic Communities.20 Studying the 
development of European company law over the past few decades reveals a 
wealth of institutional histories, discourses and blockades, national path-
dependencies, and an increasing push from the world around to adapt some 
baselines of company law and securities law in Europe to international standards. 
That this discussion has been continuing predominantly with regard to the term 
‘corporate governance’ is a telling fact. The term corporate governance has 
increasingly come to encompass all bodies of law applicable to the modern business 
corporation. Yet, a confined understanding of the term would focus on the rules 
that govern the distribution and exercise of power and control of management and 
shareholders in a large, publicly held corporation. Expanding this focus, a wider, 
more far-reaching term would aim at capturing the complex interplay of various 
bodies of law as they shape the regulatory reality of the corporation.21 Among these 
bodies of law, one will have to consider company/ corporate law, securities law, 
labour and employment law, tax law as well as the larger field of rules relating to 
industrial relations, co-determination, vocational training, and even environmental 
protection.22 The term ‘corporate governance’, meandering between such narrow 
and wide meanings, reminds us thus of much older debates over the nature of the 
business corporation and its role in society.23 As will become clear in the following 
pages, these perennial issues accompany even the present debates in European 
company law. 
Not that the task of developing European company law ever was an easy one 
to begin with.24 The diversification of company law into a larger research field of 
corporate governance renders the EC’s agenda in the field of European company 
law even more difficult. While the Enron, WorldCom and TyCo earthquakes have 
 
shaken up the legal and political consciousness worldwide,25 Europe not only 
discovers its own dead bodies (Ahold, Parmalat), but continues to face serious 
obstacles on its way to further consolidating company and securities law rules 
across an enlarged Europe of twentyfive Member States.26 With the dramatic moves 
undertaken by Brussels in the past years towards developing company and securities 
law as vital pillars of an overall attempt to improve Europe’s international 
competitiveness,27 there have been numerous initiatives on the domestic and the 
European level to further outline the challenges and obstacles for a European 
company law.28 Just as the Enron shock was to make its way across the Atlantic and 
frantic attempts unfolded to persuade the DC lawmakers to refrain from issuing 
reporting rules that would likely prove incompatible with continental corporate 
governance rules,29 the EU was in the midst of facing its own corporate 
governance challenge. 
The parallel deadlocks of adopting the statute for the Societas Europaea (SE),30 
an attempt that had proven futile for three decades, and of passing a EU directive 
governing corporate takeovers in Europe,31 an undertaking that had already been 
brought on the way in 1989,32 constituted serious problems for a European 
administration that—in tandem with many of its Member States—feverishly 
worked towards a level playing field of companies in Europe. Throughout the 1990s, 
it had increasingly seemed as if the process of European company law integration 
had lost its momentum.33 Finally, with the breakthrough at the 2000 Nice 
Summit for the SE statute, which subsequently got adopted in 2001 and went 
into force in October 2004, on the one hand, and with the all-exhausting passage of 
an eventually, much watered-down Takeover Directive34 by the European Parliament 
in December 2003, on the other, this long persisting stasis seemed to have come to 
an end. Moreover, the European Commission had seized upon the widespread 
uneasiness with the state of affairs to install an expert commission, whose first 
 
mandate had been to extrapolate the existing resistances against a European 
takeover régime and to develop a model that would be likely to satisfy the 
opponents.35 With the group of experts, under the direction of Dutch law professor, 
Jaap Winter, presenting the report in admirably short time, the group received a 
follow-up mandate, which might be seen as the starting point of a new phase in 
European company lawmaking: the group, again directed by Winter, launched a 
comprehensive online consultation on an outline for a ‘Modernized Company Law 
in Europe’—three months after presenting the first report to the public.36 The 
second report by the High Level Group was made available after a careful analysis of 
the input from the online consultation in November 2002.37 Soon after, in May 2003, 
the European Commission issued its Communication to the Council and the 
European Parliament: ‘Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate 
Governance in the European Union—A Plan to Move Forward’ (‘Action Plan’).38 
In the two years since the Commission’s Action Plan, the Commission has brought 
on the way a number of initiatives that build on the detailed programme laid out in 
2003.39 These initiatives are developed against the background of intense reform 
debates in the various Member States, not only with regard to the apparently 
inevitable move towards independent directors as mandated by the USA’s 2002 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act,40 but also in light of increasing pressure on existing systems 
of corporate management and industrial relations, in particular Germany’s 
model of co-determination.41 These activities increasingly unfold in a complex 
regulatory environment of state-set statutory law on the one hand, and of norms 
produced by expert commissions, think-tanks, quasi-public regulatory bodies, and 
private corporations on the other.42 That the European legislator should concern 
itself with issues as precarious and contested as executive compensation,43 while 
the Court of Justice marches on with increasing pressure on Member States’ rules 
on company seats,44 are clear signs of an ever-faster diversifying agenda for 
 
Brussels’ European company law programme. 
Any attempt, therefore, at rendering an adequate picture of European company 
law making has to start from the premise that such rules are now developed 
in and emerging from a multilevel process of norm-production. With this, a study of 
European company law necessarily has to take into consideration the impact of 
different localities and types of norm-production on the emergence of European wide 
rules and standards, but also the persisting patterns of political opposition against 
reform.45 The German rules governing worker participation in business 
corporations have, in that respect, become a notorious example of a régime deeply 
embedded in the country’s political economy. To touch on one part of the legal 
framework would likely result in a turmoil involving numerous other norms and 
institutions governing co-determination.46 Likewise, the described struggle over a 
European takeover régime did clearly reflect the complexities of a regulatory, socio-
economic minefield made up of cultural predispositions, institutional traditions 
(Volkswagen47 ) and established networks— all of which make any capital market 
law-oriented reformer frown, at best.48 
 
C Harmonisation versus Regulatory Competition 
The struggle over the different reasons for resistance against the SE or a Europe-
wide takeover régime was continuously fought out with regard to a seemingly 
inescapable set of methodological approaches, harmonisation, and its allegedly 
exclusive alternative, regulatory competition.49 But not only the history of the SE and 
the Takeover Directive have contributed to a more differentiated reading of these 
approaches.50 While the comparison of state competition in the USA and the 
different conflict of laws régime in the European Community had occupied theorists 
for the longest time,51 change eventually came about by the European Court of 
 
Justice. The debate over the exportability of the US experience52 took a different turn 
in light of the European Court of Justice’s Centros,53 Überseering,54 and Inspire Art55 
rulings in 1999, 2002, and 2003. Leaving no doubt, the Inspire Art decision and the 
Court of Justice’s ruling in Laysterie du Saillant56 of 2004 underscored what even 
the staunchest defenders of the seat theory and the impossibility of regulatory 
competition among Member States for corporate charters could no longer deny: that 
corporations were free to incorporate in any Member State and that their 
incorporation would have to be recognised in another Member State.57 With this 
jurisprudence, the field had opened widely. The case law from Centros to 
Laysterie du Saillant gave powerful testimony of how deeply ingrained company 
law régimes were in the particular economic, political, and cultural history of the 
Member States.58 On their face, all cases dealt with the free movement of companies 
with regard to stated or alleged motives of escaping or circumventing certain 
minimum capital or tax requirements. While the minimum capital requirement goes 
to the heart of German corporate law for limited liability companies,59 it was clear to 
all that much more was at stake. The Court of Justice’s masterful approach to 
the complexity of Member States’ company law régimes baffled observers and 
commentators for years,60 and while it now can be seen as a given that the EU sees an 
emerging system of limited regulatory competition with regard to the free 
movement of capital, the undercurrents of this development become increasingly 
visible. In the aftermath of the case law pertaining to limited liability companies, the 
literature reflects on the climatic changes with regard to the chances of survival of 
national legal structures, in particular with regard to the law of corporate governance 
writ large.61 
The history of European company law can thus be read as one of continued 
breaks, discontinuities, incremental, and revolutionary overhauls. While the 
Commission still speaks of harmonisation62 as an ‘essential for creating a Single 
 
Market for Financial services and products’, the experiences with the Societas 
Europaea, the Takeover Directive, and the free movement of companies case law 
from the Court of Justice suggest a differentiated reading of the term 
‘harmonisation’,63 if not a fundamental disillusion.64 In the light of the complexity 
of institutions, rules, and values colliding in the just described integration process, 
the opposition between harmonisation and regulatory competition seems to fall 
short of capturing the dimensions of today’s regulatory spaces such as the EU. 
Instead of being governed neither exclusively by centralised forces working 
towards the establishment of unified or compatible rules through harmonisation nor 
by an efficiency-driven process of a market battle over ‘better rules’, we find a 
multipolar and multilevel interplay of norm-production, political discourse, 
cultural, and socio-economic debate.65 In light of an increasingly laden research 
and policy agenda of European integration dynamics,66 on the one hand, and of the 
above described proliferation of corporate rules, on the other, little hope ought to be 
attached to an explanatory model that does not fully illuminate these dimensions. 
In reaching beyond both harmonisation and regulatory competition in their 
respective, exclusionary, and absolutist aspirations, we strive for being able to learn 
to adequately assess the wealth of institutional, procedural, and normative 
dimensions that characterises multipart and multilevel régimes of policy making. 
 
D Undercurrents: European History, Globalization and the Unresolved 
Question of the EU’s Nature 
The study of the dynamics between harmonisation and regulatory competition leads 
us back to the more fundamental questions regarding the ultimate goals of 
integration.67 Perhaps the company lawyer might have very little to say on this 
matter. At the same time, European company law can be understood as being so 
 
closely intertwined with the contested issues of economical and political 
integration. In this light, European company law reflects not only a field of law, 
but at the same time it is in itself an ongoing regulatory process that continues to 
challenge Member States and their respective company law systems. Indeed, this 
process has so far not given the final upper hand to either of the two approaches. 
Instead, the persisting dynamic of European company law development mostly 
results from the strong tensions among the different systems and the legal 
framework constraining either of the two poles in their ideal-type form. Being a 
veritable ‘collision of systems’,68 we would be well advised to take an even closer 
look at many proclamations of universal convergence in the law of corporate 
governance.69 This is not to say that there are very distinct signs of an 
increasingly shareholder-oriented approach in corporate governance finding its way 
into worldwide company and securities law reform. The argument here is neither to 
reject this trend nor to condemn it outright. But Europe’s very unique history of 
harmonisation/regulatory competition shows what is at stake in law reform with 
view to market demands and global integration.70 It is therefore worthwhile to keep a 
wider perspective on the issues of law reform in integrating market systems. Just as 
much as the nature of the emerging polity EU remains a matter of heated debate, 
the reach of corporate law directly touches on more fundamental issues regarding 
the place of the company in a wider regulatory environment. To disconnect 
corporate law and corporate law reform from other trends of legal and political 
reform would be to deny the corporation’s embeddedness in a much larger context 
of regulatory change. 
 
II The Political Economy of Harmonization versus Regulatory Competition 




A What Lies Beneath 
In this light, what would it mean to take a deeper look at harmonisation? From 
a harmonisation perspective, much of European law in its development and its 
adoption is closely monitored and analysed during the time of its inception. 
Sometimes, this time will span over several years or, even decades, as was the 
case for the statute and Directive of the European Company or, still more recently, 
the Takeover Directive. In contrast, it is the time and the norms’ fate after the 
adoption of the European instrument that often escapes our attention. It can thus 
be expected, that in order to study the (remaining) potential of harmonisation 
politics, much emphasis and effort must be given to engage in a deeper and more 
serious inquiry into how exactly this transformation unfolds in different Member 
States.72 
Taking a closer look at the conceptualisation, adoption, and transformation of 
legal acts by the European lawmaker into the Member States’ legal régimes 
might well illuminate the tricky process by which norms find their way into a 
particular existing legal environment.73 Taking an evolutionary approach to the 
study of legal development and of company law in particular allows for two 
things: first, this approach— as has been argued by Niklas Luhmann,74 and—with 
regard to company law in particular—by Mark Roe75 or Simon Deakin,76 refutes 
any idea of a linear, onedirectional allegedly efficiency—or coherence-driven 
development of legal norms. Instead, this approach considers historical and 
political constellations and decisions that shaped particular developments. As these 
environments have been and continue to be in flux, legal development will always 
remain unpredictable to a certain degree. Second, an evolutionary approach can 
illuminate the very intricate forms in which norm collisions and norm reforms 
 
take place. Sometimes, they result from a veritable paradigm change or from the 
importation of foreign rules and principles, something that corporate governance 
scholars have been studying in the context of legal and economic reform projects 
in young or emerging democracies and transformation markets.77 But even in less 
dramatic circumstances, the transformation and translation of European law to the 
Member State level often produces a myriad of effects within the national legal 
order, laying bare the complexity of different co-evolving, social systems.78 From 
that perspective, one may observe the introduction of a certain rule or standard, or 
as in the example of the optional co-determination régime of the Societas 
Europaea,79 even of a flexible option as having possibly severe repercussions in 
the receiving legal culture.80 The idea of co-evolution further not only suggests 
unpredictable effects or even serious irritations in the receiving specific disciplinary 
or doctrinal area. In addition, co-evolution will unfold in that the adaptation of the 
legal system to a particular rule will not be confined to the specific area, but the 
legal system’s adaptation is likely to have effects on the development of 
embedding, neighbouring systems.81 Among the neighbouring fields of corporate 
law, which will be particularly sensitive to changes in the corporate law régime, we 
find, for example, employment law, the norms governing industrial relations, and the 
rules of securities regulation. But, this wider perspective on the irritating, chaotic 
and non-linear, unpredictable effects of harmonisation82 again sheds light not only 
on the complex conditions of European company law making. It also underscores 
the intricate dynamics that characterise legal development as such. 
A systems theory-based, evolutionary approach to studying the process of 
European company law harmonisation is likely to produce valuable insights into the 
dynamics of harmonising legal cultures and into the problems resulting from 
national differences, but also from the chaotic effects that any rule introduction is 
likely to have within a particular legal culture. In rejecting the idea that law might 
 
be—when exposed to and implicated in a process of system competition—
spontaneously gravitating towards uniform solutions, an alternative vision of the 
alleged bifurcation between harmonisation and regulatory competition might 
emerge. Instead of accounting for harmonisation successes and failures with an 
exclusively quantitative measure, this approach invites a closer analysis of the 
multilevel and poly-contextual evolutionary processes set off by legal initiatives, 
policy instruments, or court decisions. 
In fact, European company law has a significance that decisively transcends 
company law as such. Researching the genesis and the fate of various 
Community directives in the field of company law improves our general 
understanding of different legal systems in Europe. It is in this light that EU law 
scholars have increasingly highlighted the importance of European learning 
processes,83 often associated now with the Open Method of Coordination.84 Our 
understanding of these legal systems, and of company law systems in particular, 
is likely to be increasingly informed by a richer assessment of these legal systems 
and of the rules and standards in a specific field. From a perspective that also 
includes the historical trajectories, the political constellations at different times of 
the system’s particular development, and the wider socio-economic embeddedness 
of a specific legal system, we recognise that, indeed, our focus on company law 
tout court et tout près must be widened in order to better understand the forces that 
drive this development. This development is, for the time being, only partly and, it 
seems, inadequately depicted by notions of convergence or divergence, 
harmonisation, unification, or regulatory competition. These concepts themselves, 
while regularly being studied with regard to their costs, benefits, and 
alternatives, in fact tell us little about the underlying processes of norm 
evolution, which they purport to explain. 
Of course, critique of regulatory competition has long been exercised. Lucian 
 
Bebchuk very rightly remarked, some years ago, in a simple, straightforward 
language, that whereas state competition furthered interests in some respects, it did 
so only with regard to a specific type of interests. In contrast, ‘state competition’, he 
wrote, failed to enhance issues of ‘significantly re-distributive’ quality, issues that 
directly affect the strength of market discipline, and, lastly, issues that implicate the 
interests of not only shareholders and managers but also third parties.85 
What is needed, it seems, is an approach to overcome the constantly 
recurring deadlock between these confronting approaches of unification versus 
regulatory competition. As we saw, the long and painful history of trying to 
harmonise European company law can serve as a strong illustration.86 These 
experiences underscore what scholars of European governance have been 
suggesting all along: that we need to rethink the troubling pair of ‘negative and 
positive integration’ from another, perhaps wider angle.87 One of the more 
promising suggestions in this regard seems to be to re-imagine legislative and 
regulatory competition as a procedural enterprise, a learning experience of dealing 
with different to incompatible norms and institutions. Certainly, theorising of 
regulatory competition has pointed to the experimentative and innovative potential of 
regulatory competition in de-centred regulatory spheres all along.88 
 
B Reflexive Governance in European Company Law 
While harmonisation aims at overcoming the disparate tendencies of national or 
regional political economies by pointing out the advantages of unifying and 
levelling existing differences, the idea of regulatory competition recognises the 
all-decisive potential of the market as a process of discovery and of elimination.89 
While harmonisation is likely to come from the top or the centre, regulatory 
competition unfolds allegedly primarily in the horizontal. Neither of these rough 
 
characterisations certainly succeeds in capturing the more sophisticated realisations 
of these paradigms. Regulatory competition can certainly integrate the idea of 
differently legitimated political actors as well as that of a hierarchy of norms. 
Harmonisation, then, can also encompass elements ranging from the poles of 
unification to approximation, in between allowing for adaptation and mutual 
learning. 
Indeed, we find signs that the all-or-nothing opposition of harmonisation and 
regulatory competition does not even seem to find a basis in the Community’s 
institutional and programmatic history. A reconsideration of the Commission’s 1985 
White Paper on Completing the European Market, which accommodated different 
interests within the framework of a single legal measure90 makes it appear 
compatible with contemporary assessments of the potential of reflexive law to 
overcome integration obstacles. In this vein, Simon Deakin has convincingly argued 
for a reflexive approach to European (corporate) law development in order to take 
into account the persisting differences among EU Member States’ systems of 
corporate law in order to allow for mutual learning processes in the context of 
European lawmaking.91 Building on these arguments, Forstinger has noted that 
‘[m]inimum standards are seeking to promote diverse, local-level approaches to 
regulatory problems by creating a space for autonomous solutions to emerge’.92 
 
III Regulatory Change and the Role of Law 
Beyond this assessment, which is reflected in parallel discussions regarding 
future prospects of European harmonisation programmes,93 lies a subtle theoretical 
appraisal of the harmonisation processes that ties this debate back to debates over 
law reform and regulatory change. The paradigm of reflexive law, originally 
developed in response to regulatory deadlock resulting from political pressure 
 
against juridification in the 1970s and early 1980s,94 has received increased 
recognition in present international debates. This recognition has occurred in the 
context of European integration95 and corporate law regulation,96 as well as that 
of environmental law97 and sustainable development.98 At present, reflexive law 
unfolds in an even more intricate manner, as comparative views on legal 
transplantation often fail to capture the co-evolutionary processes that unfold in a 
given legal, social, and political order when legal transplantation takes place. As 
argued above, rather than a mere integration into another legal order, legal 
transplantation unfolds as a sophisticated process of interaction and confrontation 
between the imported instrument and other regulatory elements within the 
receiving system. As an imported legal standard is introduced into the receiving 
legal order, other social systems, each with their own internal dynamics, are 
likely to be irritated by this import.99 This perspective ultimately illuminates the 
tenacity displayed by different systems during the process of European integration 
while, at the same time, helping us better understand the complex interplay of legal 
reform and cultural and social systems. This is particularly important, as the process 
of European company law making continues to be increasingly influenced by 
changes in the law of corporate goverance elsewhere in the world.100 The 
international debate over convergence and divergence of corporate governance 
régimes101 develops in at least two critical dimensions that have yet to gain 
sufficient recognition within mainstream scholarship on corporate law and that 
have important repercussions on the further development of European company 
law. One of these dimensions concerns the changes that are taking place with regard 
to the evolution of corporate law through a combination of private norm-generation 
through different methods of self-regulation and formal legislation.102 The radical 
changes to the process of lawmaking, through the emergence of corporate 
governance codes, codes of conduct, and recommendations of best practice that 
 
have evolved in Germany103 and other countries,104 as well as in international 
institutions,105 have an important bearing on our future assessment of corporate law 
from a comparative perspective. The second crucial dimension, ripe for review by 
contemporary corporate governance scholars, deals with the economic pressure 
experienced by mature industrial and post-industrial states to develop innovative 
means for economic and corporate growth. While this need may seem almost 
painfully commonplace,106 its realisation, in the context of radically interconnected 
markets and immense pressure on local and transnational spheres of production,107 
constitutes a pivotal issue for contemporary comparative scholars working with 
corparate governance.108 European company law and a closer look at the dynamics 
and tensions continuously unfolding in this field thus becomes a part and a 
starting point into a wider research into the contemporary political economy of 
governance through law in a globally integrating world. 
 
A Harmonisation, Competition and Integration as Narratives 
Let us finally return to the role of law in the development of European company 
law. Our challenge remains to unfold the wealth of dimensions inherent to the 
regulatory and normative vocabulary with which we engage in our contemporary 
critique of regulatory competition. The distinction between regulatory competition 
and harmonisation, regardless of how mitigated and tamed the former, how 
sophisticated and principled the latter—this distinction does not allow us to 
understand why a certain outcome might be a good one. Indeed, the debate over 
regulatory competition versus harmonisation does not by itself open a normative 
dimension, as it does not provide an adequately rich account or foundation on 
which to ask whether the outcome was ‘good’. The answer, however, is 
existential in light of the ever-growing integration of worldwide activity and the 
 
hyper-sped collision of different experiences and value systems.109 
Only a thorough assessment of the intricate history (call it narratives) and 
challenges of national governance experiences (call them administrative and 
constitutional law) can shed light on the interests as well as the lingering hopes as 
well as the remembered or repressed frustrations that tacitly but still very powerfully 
shape any form of political interaction. The examples of law reform touched upon 
in this article provide rich material evidence for the complexity of international 
integration and system competition. In order, however, to unfold a richer dimension 
of regulatory processes (competition, coordination, interaction etc.), we need to 
include our assessment of changes in lawmaking, the transformation and 
hybridisation of formerly public governance, the proliferation of laws, codes of 
conducts, conventions into our exercise of rethinking regulatory action. Only here 
can we trace the journeys that notions and terms central to our conceptualising 
take throughout history and how they perform in times of challenge. The picture 
on regulatory competition, then, changes dramatically: not only do governments (or 
parts or different levels of government) compete and certain sets of rules, but whole 
legal, social, political and economic cultures, their current states and their historical 
narratives collide. 
The study of Europe’s unique history and experience of ‘integration through 
law’110 points to an intricate interplay between succeeding, overlapping and 
repeating phases of competing policies of building a peaceful union, an economic, 
a political union.111 These terms hardly capture the wealth of political imagination 
that has gone into and continues to inform European integration, and what is more, 
they might be misleading in their respective exclusiveness and totality.112 They do, 
however, already suffice to call into question the conceptual pair of harmonisation 
and regulatory competition when applied to explain and to illuminate the manifold 
faces of Europe’s search of ‘meaning and purpose’.113 With a view to the degrees of 
 
European and international cooperation and coordination that have been 
characterised as multilevel governance,114 one could be tempted to argue for a 
move from harmonisation and competition on to different degrees of regulatory 
coordination, cooperation, or interaction to overcome the above described 
shortcomings in the concepts of competition and harmonisation. Yet, a mere 
substitution of the diametric scheme of regulatory competition versus 
harmonisation by a model of ‘regulatory interaction’ might still fall short of unfolding 
a comprehensive description of processes of international and transnational 
integration. The reasons for this are easier to find than an answer to our question of 
how to fruitfully complement or even to overcome the pair of 
harmonisation/competition. Concepts such as harmonisation, regulatory 
competition, and regulatory interaction seem to share a striking shortcoming in that 
they remain too exclusively centred on specific premises of regulation in the first 
place. The starting point of the preceding discussion therefore was the contestation of 
actor-centred premises that would inform a programme of regulatory interaction, 
and that could also be said to lie behind the known approaches to harmonisation 
and regulatory competition.115 In order to further explore and, ultimately, to 
reconsider these approaches within a wider regulatory framework of the law of 
corporate governance, we need to study the changing face of regulation as such. 
This will eventually allow us to place the inquiry into the prospects of European 
company law in a larger context of regulatory developments, not only on the 
European level, but also on the Nation State level and globally.116 A central tenet of 
this article has been that we need to assess the chances of border-crossing 
regulatory régimes such as European company law as part of a transnational law of 
corporate governance against the background of regulatory transformations inside 
and outside of the Nation State. We are well advised to carefully trace the changes 
of both actors and actions as they can be observed in complex, contemporary 
 
regulatory environments. In short: where we see a continuing erosion of the 
conceptual boundaries between the (political, interventionist, welfare, post-
regulatory, supervision) state and (allegedly a-political) market, we begin to 
question the applicability and translatability of our concepts of state/market and 
public/private in the realm of transnational regulation.117 It is only through the 
observation of this repetition of the public/private distinction inside and outside of 
the Nation State that we may learn more about the chances of regulatory politics 
in a dramatically de-centralised, global knowledge economy. This has 
repercussions on our understanding of regulatory instruments and spaces. While 
these instruments (laws, directives, decisions, political programmes, codes of 
conduct) show a complex mix of hard and soft law, political intervention and 
self-regulation, the spaces and places of regulation become horizontally and 
vertically open. Regulation today takes place in many different spaces and on 
many different levels of normcreation, increasingly challenging the fixture on the 
state as the sole author of binding norms.118  In this multilevel game of various 
public and private actors, traditional concepts of legitimacy have become as 
questionable as ideas of causation in contemporary tort law. It is here where we 
begin to understand the ways in which actors and authors occupy regulatory spaces 
that seem to follow rules that are less man-made than that they unfold from within the 
constant collision of heterogeneous functional imperatives as well as normative 
claims. From this perspective, then, our inquiry might add to a critical reassessment 
of the role and the nature of law itself. 
 
B Law’s Boundaries? 
This would, however, move our inquiry well beyond the confines of the so-far 
described assessments of European company law. It would entail questions such as 
 
which role law can play in the facilitation of regulatory competition. What role can 
law play, if law itself were to be seen as no more than one particular social system 
whose function is to stabilise expectations? More importantly, and on a normative 
plane, what if law as a particular social system was just one among other systems, 
the rationalities of which constantly collide, and where the outcome might be far 
from any unification? 
Perhaps, law ought to be understood as a social system whose function should 
be seen in allowing communicative meaning to survive from the battlefield of 
contemporary conflict into tomorrow’s search for stability, certainty (and 
memory). Law can fulfil this stabilising function—despite, or should we say 
because of its relative autonomy from the rule-production that is otherwise taking 
place in the parameters of economic exchange or political discourse. Law’s 
reproduction of meaning consists of capturing a specific, timely understanding of 
‘legal’ as differentiated from ‘illegal’, without however allowing a larger societal 
discourse to set, shape, and further define this meaning and distinction of 
legal/illegal—against the tides of domestic and international conflict. Instead, law 
has an introverted tendency through which it develops rules and norms that are 
informed by yesterday’s and today’s definition and assignment of legal/illegal, and 
that will serve as guiding post and reminder when applied to conflict situations 
tomorrow. In a paradoxical moment of vulnerability and sovereignty over the 
concrete case, the law relies on its rules, which have been developed through 
repeated application in previous cases, and it is through this application today that 
the law constantly refines and improves its sensitivity for each new and different 
case. As such, law itself allows for an in-depth assessment of the various semantic 
heritages that are at work in our use of legal terms.119 At the same time, law competes 
with other narratives in making sense of the present regulatory challenges. In fact, it is 
only by way of engaging in an interdisciplinary inquiry that we can better 
 
understand the potential for law in this process. If it is true that legal terms, 
their history, and trajectory transport—even if in hidden form—the political 
aspirations and frustrations that accompanied their emergence or followed their 
failure, than a close look at our conceptions of governance might offer a 
promising way towards better assessing the chances of changing forms of 
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